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Abstract
The ideas about decision making under ig-
norance in economics are combined with
the ideas about uncertainty representation in
computer science. The combination sheds
new light on the question of how artificial
agents can act in a dynamically consistent
manner. The notion of sequential consis-
tency is formalized by adapting the law of it-
erated expectation for plausibility measures.
The necessary and sufficient condition for a
certainty equivalence operator for Nehring-
Puppe’s preference to be sequentially consis-
tent is given. This result sheds light on the
models of decision making under uncertainty.
1 INTRODUCTION
Ignorance as a state of knowledge is often character-
ized by the absence of relevant uncertainty informa-
tion. Bayesian decision theory developed in the 1940s
and 1950s, assuming the relevant risk is described by
a probability function, ranks available actions by ex-
pected utility. The nature of the probability func-
tion can be objective (based on evidence) or subjective
(based on personal preference). Almost immediately,
many economists [19], [1] have been interested in the
question how an individual should make decision if she
can’t associate any probability distribution to possible
consequences of each alternative because of lack of ev-
idence or violation of Savage’s axioms. Following Sav-
age’s axiomatic approach, the earlier studies describe
rational preference under ignorance by its characteris-
tic properties.
The sustained interest in the problem is motivated by
many real life circumstances in which ignorance arises
naturally, for example, in competitive games where in-
formation about the opponent is scarce, unreliable, or
even intentionally misleading. It is often a mistake to
fill the void left by the lack of hard evidence with an-
alytic and judgmental assumptions and then act upon
those judgments as if they were facts.
In their attempts to create artificial agents with in-
telligence, computer scientists encounter the problem
of how to program the behavior of the agents in the
face of lack of information. While borrowing heavily
from economists and philosophers, computer scientists
also have to be concerned with the question of how to
represent the state of ignorance. For economists, ig-
norance means the absence of probability information,
therefore it can be declared by simply leaving out the
probability component. For artificial agents, it is desir-
able to have a method for uncertainty representation
in which the ignorance is obtained at the limit when
the amount of information an agent has approaches
zero. I call this representation vacuous belief. (This
term is used here in its generic sense that includes but
is not identical with a narrower usage in the Dempster-
Shafer theory of belief functions.) In other words, “ig-
norance” and “vacuous belief” are synonyms but they
differ by representation: the former is recognized by
the absence of the uncertainty component, the latter
is encoded by a particular representation of belief.
An important property of the expected utility (EU)
model is the dynamic consistency which can be iden-
tified with the law of iterated expectation. E[U ] =
E[E[U |W ]] where random variable U represents util-
ity of an act under risk and W is information that
can be observed. The expectation of U can be cal-
culated by, first, taking expectations of U given the
values of W and then, taking expectation on the con-
ditional expected values. The practical importance of
the law is self-evident given its widespread applica-
tion. In particular, neither the folding-back procedure
nor the divide-and-conquer planning technique used
to control complexity would be possible without this
property.
In this paper, I examine decision making with vacuous
belief, the representations of ignorance. Unlike most
of the works on this topic, I insist that vacuous belief
is just a state of belief. Hence, decision making un-
der ignorance is decision making in which the state of
belief happens to be vacuous. This view allows me to
ask questions about dynamic consistency that are not
sensible if ignorance is declared by the absence of the
uncertainty component.
2 REPRESENTATION OF
IGNORANCE
Assume a finite state space Ω, the set of possible states
of nature. The uncertainty information is encoded
in the form of a plausibility function ∆. Here I use
the term in accordance with Halpern’s definition [8],
a representation of uncertainty that generalizes many
familiar approaches such as probability theory, sets of
probability measures, Dempster-Shafer belief function
theory [20] and possibility theory [4]. It is convenient
to think of states of Ω in terms of relevant variables.
Variables are denoted by the capital letters to the end
of the alphabet: X,Y, Z whose values are denoted by
lower case letters. A state is a tuple or concatenation
of values, one for each variable. The terms events and
subsets of states are used interchangeably and denoted
by capital letters to the start of the alphabet: A,B,C.
∆ is a function from the algebra of subsets of Ω, the
frame of reference, to a partially ordered set S, the
plausibility scale. S includes the top (⊤) and the bot-
tom (⊥) elements and is equipped with relation ≥ that
is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric. Conceptu-
ally, ⊤ means certainty, ⊥ - impossibility and ≥ reads
“more plausible”. Three axioms are assumed for plau-
sibility measure: ∆(∅) = ⊥; ∆(Ω) = ⊤; and If A ⊆ B
then ∆(B) ≥ ∆(A).
∆ is equipped with two operators. The definition of
the restriction operator is given below. The condition-
ing operator, given ∆, creates a plausibility measure
∆A on the algebra of subsets of A.
Definition 1 Suppose H = {Ai}
m
i=1 is partition of Ω
and ∆ is a plausibility on the algebra of subsets of Ω,
the restriction of ∆ on H is the mapping ∆H defined
on the algebra based on partition H as follows: for any
I ⊆ {1, 2, . . .m}, ∆H(∪i∈IAi) 7→ ∆(∪i∈IAi).
It is clear that ∆H satisfies all three plausibility ax-
ioms and hence is a plausibility function. Viewing
each variable as a dimension one uses to describe
the world, restriction obtains when one or more vari-
ables/dimensions are removed.
What plausibility function can be used for vacuous
belief? In their ground-breaking work in early 1950s,
Hurwicz & Arrow [1] argue that choice under ignorance
should be invariant with respect to relabeling the states
(property B in their paper) and deletion of duplicate
states (property C). Define an act to be a mapping
from Ω to a set of consequences. A state ω ∈ Ω is called
duplicate wrt a set of acts D if there is another ω′ ∈ Ω
and ω 6= ω′ such that ∀f ∈ D, f(ω) = f(ω′). Much
later and in a different context of statistical inference,
Walley [24] proposes two criteria that a vacuous belief
must satisfy. The embedding principle requires that
plausibility of an event A should not depend on the
sample space in which A is embedded. The symmetry
principle says that all elements in the sample space
should be assigned the same plausibility. Intuitively,
the symmetry principle and the relabeling invariance
have the same informative content and so do the em-
bedding principle and the deletion invariance. I for-
malize these criteria.
Definition 2 A class V of plausibility functions of fi-
nite domains on plausibility scale S is called vacuous
if there exists v ∈ S, called vacuous element such that
for IGΩ ∈ V and ∅ 6= A ⊂ Ω then IGΩ(A) = v.
This definition is met by several intuitive representa-
tions of ignorance found in literature. The first exam-
ple of vacuous belief is the set of all probability func-
tions on Ω. The plausibility scale is the set of pairs
Z = {〈a, b〉 |0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1} interpreted as lower and
upper probabilities. The partial order 〈a, b〉 ≥Z 〈a
′, b′〉
if a ≥ a′ and b ≥ b′. The vacuous element is v = 〈0, 1〉.
For DS belief function theory, a belief function maps
each event A to a pair 〈Bel(A), Pl(A)〉. A vacuous
belief function, according to the above definition, is
one that has Ω as the only focus m(Ω) = 1. In
the possibility theory, vacuous belief is the function
∀ω ∈ Ω, π(ω) = 1. Using the characterization of DS
belief function by a convex set of probability functions
and the characterization of a possibility function by a
consonant belief function, one can show formally that
those representations of ignorance are equivalent [20].
Several remarks are necessary. First, no single proba-
bility function satisfies the definition of vacuous belief.
Second, the choice of plausibility scale S is important
in meeting the definition. In particular, Halpern’s pro-
posal [8] (p.53) would not work. Suppose P is a set
of probability measures on Ω, Halpern suggests to use
the set of all functions from P to [0, 1] with ≥S be the
pointwise ordering on functions as the plausibility scale
S. That is, the plausibility value PlP(A) is a function
pA such that ∀µ ∈ P, pA(µ) = µ(A). The advantage
of using this plausibility scale in comparison with a
more traditional way of taking lower and upper en-
velopes is that it can distinguish between different sets
of probability measures that have the same lower and
upper envelopes. The downside of this proposal is that
it makes intuitively equal plausibility values incompa-
rable. For example, consider the set of all probabil-
ity measures, Halpern’s plausibility scale would make
any two events incomparable except when they are in-
cluded in one another. In the lower-upper envelope
approach all the events have the same plausibility.
From the definitions, a lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 1 The restriction of vacuous belief IGΩ on a
partition H = {Ai}
k
i=1 of Ω is also a vacuous belief.
A necessary part of any description of a plausibility
measure is the specification of a conditioning operator
that is used to update belief upon the arrival of new
evidence. There are different ways to define condition-
ing even for the same plausibility measure. Halpern [8]
(Ch. 3) provides an excellent discussion of the issues.
Despite the variety, as our interest in this case limits
itself to vacuous belief, a minimal requirement for a
conditioning operator to be considered reasonable is
that conditioning of a vacuous belief on any event is
again vacuous. Formally, I state it as an assumption.
Assumption 1 Suppose IGΩ is the vacuous belief on
Ω. For any A ⊂ Ω, the conditional plausibility on A,
IGA, is again vacuous.
Note the convention by which conditioning is denoted
by subscript and restricting by superscript. It can be
seen that this assumption is satisfied by the condition-
ing defined for sets of probability measures; by both
types of conditioning defined for DS belief functions
(one is based on the interpretation of DS belief func-
tions as sets of probabilities and the other is based on
Dempster’s rule of combination); and by both types
of conditioning (quantitative and ordinal) defined for
possibility functions [4]. The assumption follows from
an intuitive argument. If one starts with vacuous be-
lief, the events in Ω are indistinguishable in terms of
plausibility. After observation of the truth of A, the
events that are not compatible with A are excluded.
For the remaining events, both the symmetry and em-
bedding principles still apply. Therefore, the condi-
tional plausibility should be vacuous.
In sum, the class of vacuous plausibilities is closed un-
der conditioning and restricting operators.
3 DECISION UNDER IGNORANCE
A decision situation can be described by a tuple
(Ω,∆,U ,D). Ω and ∆ are defined in section 2. U =
[0, 1] is the outcome space. The numeric value of an
outcome is interpreted in a generic utility unit. Any
bounded set of consequences that satisfies conditions
of Debreu’s theorem [3] can be converted to the unit
interval. D is the act space. An act is a mapping
Ω → U . It is said to be resolved on a set of variables
if knowing the values of the variables is sufficient to
determine the outcome of the act. A constant act is
∀s ∈ Ω, f(s) = c. Constant acts are denoted by their
outcomes. An act can also be written as a contract
consisting of a set of rules {Ai →֒ wi|i = 1,m} where
f−1 is a set-valued inverse of f and Ai = f
−1(wi).
Rule Ai →֒ wi means “if Ai occurs then wi obtains”.
It is clear that the collection {Ai} is a partition of Ω.
Two acts f, h, despite notational difference, are equiv-
alent if they deliver the same outcome in each state.
A preference relation  on acts is an order i.e., is com-
plete and transitive and reflexive. The asymmetric and
symmetric parts of  are denoted by ≻ and ∼ respec-
tively.  is required to reduce to the numerical order
on constant acts i.e., for c1, c2 ∈ U , c1  c2 iff c1 ≥ c2.
Decision under ignorance has been discussed, among
others, by Maskin [13], Nehring & Puppe [15] and more
recently Puppe & Schlag [16] and Larbi et al [11]. Due
to the lack of uncertainty information, it is a conven-
tion to identify an act with its set of possible outcomes.
The ground-breaking result was made in early 1950s
by Hurwicz & Arrow [1]. The basic construct is a
choice operator (ˆ ) that for each set of available acts
D returns a subset of optimal acts Dˆ ⊆ D. Arrow and
Hurwicz postulated four rationality properties (prop-
erties A to D) that the choice operator must satisfy.
They have shown that under complete ignorance, only
extreme (the best and the worst) consequences matter.
This result characterizes a family of utility functions
including max, min and linear combinations of mini-
mal and maximal values. Arrow-Hurwicz’s conclusion
has also been shown to hold under less stringent con-
ditions. For example, in [11], it has been shown that
the same characterization holds even without the con-
struct of state space (acts are viewed as sets of conse-
quences not as mappings from states to consequences).
Here I follow the approach by Nehring and Puppe [15].
Denote by F(U) the set of finite non-empty subsets of
U . The authors consider a partial order NP (transi-
tive and reflexive) on F(U) and require the satisfaction
of two conditions described below.
Context independence (I) Suppose A ∈ F(U),
x, y ∈ U and x, y 6∈ A, if x ≥ y then A ∪ {x} NP
A ∪ {y}.
The definition of the continuity condition uses the con-
cept of convergence of subsets in Hausdorff space.
Definition 3 (Convergence on F(U)) Denote Ox
for an open set containing x. A sequence (Ai)
∞
i=1 in
F(U) converges to A ∈ F(U) if for any collection of
open sets O = {Ox|x ∈ A} and for all sufficiently large
n: An ⊆ ∪O and An ∩Ox 6= ∅ for all Ox ∈ O.
Continuity (C) Suppose A,B ∈ F(U) and sequence
(Ai)
∞
i=1 in F(U) converges to A. If An NP B for all
n then A NP B
Condition (I) says that preference between two val-
ues by does not depend on the context i.e., the set of
other outcomes they go with. Condition (C) requires
NP to be continuous. Consider the set of ordered
pairs Z = {〈a, b〉 |0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1} and a preorder
≫ on Z. Relation ≫ is said to be continuous if
{y ∈ Z|y≫ x} and {y ∈ Z|x≫ y} are closed for any
x. ≫ is said to be weakly monotonic if a ≥ a′ and
b ≥ b′ implies 〈a, b〉 ≫ 〈a′, b′〉. The main result of
Nehring and Puppe is a theorem by which the prefer-
ence between two sets of outcomes is decided by the
preference between their pairs of minimal and maximal
elements.
Theorem 1 (Nehring and Puppe 1996) NP on
F(U) satisfies conditions I and C iff there is a con-
tinuous and weakly monotonic ≫ on Z such that for
A,B ∈ F(U), A NP B iff
〈min(A),max(A)〉 ≫ 〈min(B),max(B)〉 (1)
Moreover, ≫ is unique. Conversely, given a contin-
uous and weakly monotonic ≫ on Z, NP on F(U)
is uniquely determined.
As mentioned before, in Nehring-Puppe’s theorem
NP is a partial order. For the rest of the paper,
I assume that NP is complete and drop the sub-
script i.e., for any A,B ∈ F(U) either A  B or
B  A. By eq. 1, ≫ is also complete. Set B =
{min(A),max(A)} in eq. 1, it follows immediately that
A ∼ {min(A),max(A)}. For z ∈ Z define z↑ = {x ∈
U| 〈x, x〉 ≫ z} and z↓ = {x ∈ U|z≫ 〈x, x〉}. Clearly,
both z↓ and z↑ are nonempty (0 ∈ z↓ and 1 ∈ z↑)
and because of completeness of ≫ , z↓ ∪ z↑ = U . By
continuity, there is a unique x ∈ U such that x ∼ z. A
lemma follows.
Lemma 2 If  on F(U) is a weak order (complete,
transitive and reflexive) and satisfies conditions I and
C then for each A ∈ F(U) there is a unique x ∈ U
such that A ∼ x.
Such a value is called the certainty equivalence or ce
of A. Thus, lemma 2 establishes, from the semantics
side, the existence of ce for any act (its outcomes).
From the operational side, the concern is to have a
procedure that can compute the ce of any act under
any plausibility measure. An evaluation model or ce
operator is a functional E : C×D → U where C is a class
of plausibility measures and D is the set of acts. In
general, V ⊂ C i.e., the class of vacuous plausibilities
is a subset of C but here I focus on V only. I say that
E correctly implements  if
E(∆, f) = x iff f(Ω) ∼ x (2)
where ∆ is a vacuous plausibility and f(Ω) is the set
of outcomes of f . This semantics implies several prop-
erties that E must satisfy.
Unanimity For x ∈ U , E(∆, x) = x.
Range E(∆, f) = E(∆, {min(f(Ω)),max(f(Ω))}).
Monotonicity If a ≥ a′ and b ≥ b′ then
E(∆, {a, b}) ≥ E(∆, {a′, b′}).
Continuity limx→a E(∆, {x, b}) = E(∆, {a, b}) and
limx→b E(∆, {a, x}) = E(∆, {a, b}).
The notation {a, b} is used to denote any act h such
that h(Ω) = {a, b}. Unanimity and Range are di-
rect consequences of theorem 1. According to Una-
nimity, for constant acts, uncertainty does not matter.
Monotonicity and Continuity of E follow from the weak
monotonicity and the continuity of ≫ .
These properties for E specify a wide class of func-
tions that include familiar examples such as min, max
and a weighted average of min and max (Hurwicz’s
α−criterion). Max and Min functions can be charac-
terized by imposing a new condition on . For exam-
ple, the max function is characterized by (I), (C) and
a new condition (M): if A,B ∈ F(U) and A ⊆ B then
B  A. The Min function can be characterized by
reversing the preference direction of (M) [15]. How-
ever, min and max are often criticized for being too
extreme. In particular, (M) and its reverse are hard
to defend based on common sense.
Hurwicz’s criterion seems to be more reasonable but it
has been found (for example in [9]) that it suffers from
a “dynamic inconsistency” problem.
4 DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY OF
DECISION WITH VACUOUS
BELIEF
Dynamic consistency is a normative property that has
a fundamental role in rational decision making. In
the words of McClennen [14], it is about “consistency
between planned choice and actual choice”. It can
also be viewed as a statement about decision maker’s
information processing efficiency. In this section, I’ll
be concerned with a specific form of dynamic consis-
tency namely sequential consistency as formulated by
Sarin and Wakker [17]. For computer scientists, this
property is of particular importance because ubiqui-
tous application of folding-back procedures would not
be possible without it. I need some definitions leading
to the formalization of sequential consistency.
Definition 4 For an act f = {Ai →֒ xi}
m
i=1 and event
A ⊂ Ω, the conditional act fA is defined to be {Ai ∩
A →֒ xi|1 ≤ i ≤ m,Ai ∩A 6= ∅}.
Definition 5 If f = {Ei →֒ xi}
k
i=1 then a new rule
A →֒ f is the set of rules obtained by prefixing A →֒
to each rule in f i.e., A →֒ f = {A →֒ Ei →֒ xi}
k
i=1.
The meaning of two-stage rule A →֒ Ei →֒ xi is that
if A is true and Ei is true then the reward is xi. This
definition can be extended for multi-stage rules.
Lemma 3 For any partion H = {Ak}
K
k=1 of Ω, f and
{Ak →֒ fAk}
K
k=1 are equivalent.
Proof: I have to show that for any s ∈ Ω, f(s) and
the outcome received act {Ak →֒ fAk}
K
k=1 is the same.
Suppose f(Ω) = {wj |1 ≤ j ≤ J}, one can write the
identity f = {f−1(wj) →֒ wj}
J
j=1. So fAk = {Ak ∩
f−1(wj) →֒ wj}
J
j=1. Since {Ak}
K
k=1 is a partition of Ω,
∪Kk=1(Ak ∩f
−1(wj)) = f
−1(wj). For any s ∈ f
−1(wj),
there is k such that s ∈ Ak. On the one hand f(s) =
wj . On the other hand, at s, Ak is true and so is
Ak ∩ f
−1(wj), therefore act {Ak →֒ {Ak ∩ f
−1(wj) →֒
wj}
J
j=1}
K
k=1 delivers wj .
I am now in the position to formalize the notion of
sequential consistency.
Definition 6 Suppose H = {Ai|1 ≤ i ≤ m} is a par-
tition of Ω. The ce operator E is said to be sequentially
consistent wrt H if for any act f and plausibility ∆
E(∆, f) = E(∆H, {Ai →֒ E(∆Ai , fAi)}
m
i=1) (3)
where ∆H is the restriction of ∆ on H; {Ai →֒
E(∆Ai , fAi)}
m
i=1 is an act defined on the algebra of H;
and ∆Ai , fAi are conditionals of ∆ and f on Ai.
This definition makes clear that the sequential consis-
tency property is the basis of recursive (folding-back)
evaluation of a decision tree. Partition H labels the
branches emanating from a node attached with ∆ and
act f . Each of the children-nodes is attached with
conditional plausibility measure ∆Ai and conditional
act fAi . E(∆, f) on the left-hand side of eq. 3 is the
direct application of the ce operator for ∆ and f . On
the right-hand side, E(∆Ai , fAi) is the application of
the ce operator for ith child-node. The obtained cer-
tainty equivalence replaces the subtree attached to
that node i.e., the subtree is folded. The outer ex-
pression E(∆H, {Ai →֒ ·}
m
i=1) is the application of the
ce operator for the remaining tree.
If ∆ is a probability function (P ), then eq. 3 is nothing
but the law of iterated expectation where E(P, f) can
be re-written in the familiar notation, EP [f ], and the
right-hand side as E[E[f |H]].
In section 2, I argue that the vacuous plausibility class
is closed under conditioning and restricting operations.
That is if ∆ ∈ V then for any partition H and any
event A, ∆H ∈ V and ∆A ∈ V. Thus, in eq. 3, all the
applications of the ce operator are for vacuous belief.
I’ll characterize a ce operator E for vacuous belief that
satisfies all properties: Unanimity, Range, Monotonic-
ity, Continuity and Sequential consistency. With the
plausibility argument of E assumed to be vacuous, I
can use a cleaner notation EV : F(U) → U . Con-
sider a function γ : Z → [0, 1] where, as before,
Z = {〈a, b〉 |0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1}. Given the satisfaction of
the Range property, EV is completely determined by γ
and vice versa: ∀A ∈ F(U)
EV (A) = x ⇔ γ(min(A),max(A)) = x (4)
I’ll translate the properties that EV must satisfy into
requirements for γ.
Lemma 4 Suppose functions EV : F(U) → U and
γ : Z → [0, 1] are related via eq. 4. EV satisfies Una-
nimity, Range, Monotonicity, Continuity and Sequen-
tial consistency iff γ is continuous in each of the ar-
guments and satisfies
(i) For 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, γ(x, x) = x;
(ii) If x ≥ x′, y ≥ y′ then γ(x, y) ≥ γ(x′, y′); and
(iii) For 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1
γ(x, y) = γ(γ(x, x), γ(x, y)) = γ(γ(x, y), γ(y, y)) (5)
Proof: (sketch) The facts that Range and Continu-
ity of EV are equivalent to γ being continuous and
determined by eq. 4 are clear. So is the correspon-
dence between (i) and Unanimity; (ii) and Monotonic-
ity. To see to the equivalence between Sequential con-
sistency (eq. 3) and condition (iii). Choose an act f
such that f(Ω) = {x, y}. Set E = f−1(x), (hence
f−1(y) = E¯). Consider a partition H = {A, A¯} such
that A ⊂ E. Clearly, for conditional acts fA(A) = {x}
and fA¯(A¯) = {x, y}. Rewrite eq. 3 for f and H
EV ({x, y}) = EV ({EV (x, x), EV (x, y)}).
If one chooses A for partition such that A ⊃ E then
EV ({x, y}) = EV ({EV (x, y), EV (y, y)}).
Rewriting these equalities using eq. 4 yields eq. 5.
Now I characterize function γ.
Theorem 2 Function γ : Z → [0, 1] satisfies the con-
ditions described in lemma 4 iff there exists a value
a ∈ [0, 1] for which
γ(x, y) =


y if y ≤ a
a if x ≤ a ≤ y
x if x ≥ a
(6)
Lemma 5 Suppose γ satisfies properties (i), (ii) and
(iii). If γ(x, 1) = a > x for some x ∈ [0, 1] then
∀y ∈ [x, a], γ(y, 1) = a. Similarly, if γ(0, z) = a < z
for some z ∈ [0, 1] then ∀y ∈ [a, z], γ(0, y) = a.
Proof: (lemma) By properties (i) and (iii), I have
a = γ(x, 1) = γ(γ(x, x), γ(x, 1)) = γ(x, a) and a =
γ(x, 1) = γ(γ(x, 1), γ(1, 1)) = γ(a, 1). It follows from
property (ii) that for any y in the interval [x, a], a =
γ(x, a) ≤ γ(y, 1) ≤ γ(a, 1) = a.
Proof: (theorem) (⇐) It is necessary to show that
the function γ given by (6) is continuous on each ar-
gument and satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii). For a fixed value
x0, γ(x0, y) is continuous on y. In the case x0 ≤ a and
if x0 ≤ b ≤ a limy→b γ(x0, y) = b = γ(x0, b). If b ≥ a,
limy→b γ(x0, y) = a = γ(x0, b). In the case x0 ≥ a,
limy→b γ(x0, y) = x0 = γ(x0, b). Similarly, it can be
shown that γ(x, y0) is continuous on x for any fixed
y0. The verification of (i) and (ii) is straightforward.
Next, I have to show (iii) (eq. 5). In the first case, if
z ≤ a then γ(x, z) = z, γ(x, y) = y and γ(y, z) = z
hence γ(γ(x, y), γ(y, z)) = γ(y, z) = z. In the sec-
ond case, if x ≥ a then γ(x, z) = x, γ(x, y) = x and
γ(y, z) = y, hence γ(γ(x, y), γ(y, z)) = γ(x, y) = x.
In the third case x ≤ a and z ≥ a, γ(x, z) = a.
If y ≤ a then γ(x, y) = y and γ(y, z) = a. Hence,
γ(γ(x, y), γ(y, z)) = γ(y, a) = a. If y ≥ a, γ(x, y) = a
and γ(y, z) = y, then γ(γ(x, y), γ(y, z)) = a.
(⇒) Suppose γ is a continuous function and satisfies
(i), (ii) and (iii). Set a = γ(0, 1). Assume 0 < a < 1.
By lemma 5, γ(0, a) = γ(a, 1) = a. By (ii), if
x ≤ a ≤ y then a ≤ γ(0, a) ≤ γ(x, y) ≤ γ(a, 1) = a. In
other words, if arguments are in both sides of a then
γ(x, y) = a.
Now I consider the case when both arguments are
on the same side of a. Assume that x, y ≥ a. Our
goal is to show by contradiction that γ(x, y) = x.
Suppose, on the contrary, there exists x0, y0 ≥ a
such that γ(x0, y0) > x0. Because of (ii) γ(x0, 1) =
x1 ≥ γ(x0, y0) > x0. By lemma 5, x in the inter-
val [x0, x1], γ(x, 1) = x1. Consider set Ax1 = {x|x ≥
a, γ(x, 1) = x1}. This set includes interval [x0, x1].
Choose a′ = inf Ax1 . Clearly, a ≤ a
′ ≤ x0 < x1. For
any x in the neighborhood of a′ and a′ < x ≤ x1, by
definition of a′, there is a′ < x′ ≤ x such that x′ ∈ Ax1 .
By lemma 5, γ(x, 1) = x1.
I will show that for x < a′, γ(x, 1) ≤ a′. Suppose the
contrary, γ(x3, 1) = a
′′ > a′ for some x3 < a
′. By
lemma 5, for any x ∈ [x3, a
′′], γ(x, 1) = a′′. Clearly,
the intersection (a′, x1]∩ [x3, a
′′] is not empty. For x in
the intersection, γ(x, 1) = x1 and γ(x, 1) = a
′′. Hence
x1 = a
′′. Thus, for x3 < a
′ and γ(x3, 1) = x1. This
contradicts the fact that a′ is the infimum of Ax1 . So,
γ(x, 1) ≤ a′ for x < a′.
For a sequence {xi} that approaches a
′ from below
limxi↑a′(γ(xi, 1)) ≤ a
′. But for a sequence {yi} that
approaches a′ from above limyi↓a′ γ(yi, 1) = x1. So,
γ(·, 1) is not continuous at a′. This contradiction
shows that γ(x, y) = x for a ≤ x ≤ y. Similarly,
one can show that 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ a, γ(x, y) = y.
The main result combines lemma 4 and theorem 2.
Theorem 3 The ce operator EV for vacuous belief
satisfies properties Unanimity, Range, Monotonicity,
Continuity and Sequential consistency iff there is a
constant a ∈ [0, 1] such that for A ∈ F(U),
EV (A)=


max(A) if max(A) ≤ a
a if min(A) ≤ a ≤ max(A)
min(A) if min(A) ≥ a
(7)
Corollary 1 Suppose  is a weak order (reflexive,
transitive and complete) that satisfies conditions (I)
and (C). A sequentially consistent ce operator EV cor-
rectly implements  iff it has the form (7).
Form (7) includes min and max functions as special
cases with a = 0 and a = 1 respectively. It is also
clear that for any 0 < α < 1 Hurwicz’s α−criterion,
αmin+(1− α)max, does not satisfy (7).
The equality a = EV ({0, 1}) gives an operational in-
terpretation for the constant a. It is the value that the
decision maker gives in exchange for set of outcomes
{0, 1}. The lower the value of a the more uncertainty
averse she is.
5 DISCUSSION
Enduring interest in the problem of decision making
under ignorance can be explained, partly, by its puz-
zling nature, and partly, by the relevance to many
practical situations (see [2] for a survey). Nehring and
Puppe [15] characterizes preference λ that is com-
plete and satisfies condition (C) and (SI) below.
Strong independence (SI) For all A,B ∈ F(U), x 6∈
A ∪B, if A λ B then A ∪ x λ B ∪ x.
(SI) implies, hence, is strictly stronger than (I). For
example both Hurwicz’s α−criterion with α 6= 0, 1 and
median rule (A med B iff med(A) ≥ med(B)) satisfy
(I) but not (SI). They show that there exists λ ∈ [0, 1]
such that
A λ B iff


λ ≥ max(A) ≥ max(B) or
min(A) ≥ min(B) ≥ λ or
max(A) ≥ λ ≥ min(B)
(8)
It can be seen that the ce operator EV in eq. 7 cor-
rectly implements λ. Condition (I), although strictly
weaker than (SI), in conjunction with (C) and Sequen-
tial consistency are equivalent to combination of (C)
and (SI). In this relationship, Sequential consistency
and (SI) reinforce each other.
The issue of dynamic inconsistency, the divergence be-
tween planned choice and actual choice, is raised in dis-
cussion of non expected utility models [14, 12, 17, 22].
The models that can account for observed systematic
violations of SEU prescriptions, themselves violate the
type of dynamic consistency that SEU satisfies. For an
artificial agent, the dynamic consistency is important
because it assures that the agent can achieve optimal-
ity by acting according to an optimal plan.
Although both decision making under ignorance and
the dynamic consistency are under extensive discus-
sion in the economics literature, to the best of my
knowledge, the issues have never been examined in
conjunction with each other. They seem to be incom-
patible. Being equalized to the absence of information,
ignorance, like a ghost, does not have a representation.
Under ignorance, acts are just sets of outcomes. On
the other hand, dynamic consistency is all about up-
dating and reaction to the updated information.
Computer scientists have many reasons to be inter-
ested in the notion of ignorance and its representation.
Programming artificial agents, they have to treat igno-
rance differently by giving it a proper representation.
The vacuous belief is just another state of belief on
which conditioning and restricting operations are le-
gitimate to perform. In order for a decision model to
be dynamically consistent in general, it must be so in
the case of the vacuous belief. Formula (7) provides a
test case to disprove the sequential consistency claim.
More important value from the study of decision
making with the vacuous belief comes from the fact
that the vacuous belief is a common denominator on
which different formal uncertainty frameworks con-
verge. Any formal uncertainty framework worth
its salt should be able to express certainty on one
end of the spectrum and ignorance on the other
end. Moreover, these concepts are clearly framework-
independent. That is, their meaning does not depend
on uncertainty language in which they are expressed.
As mentioned in section 2, the vacuous set of all prob-
ability measures, the vacuous DS belief function and
the vacuous possibility function are all mathematically
equivalent. So, at least they all pass the “worthy” test.
This makes the vacuous belief a unique testing ground
in which decision models for various formal uncertainty
frameworks can be directly compared. Unfortunately,
this opportunity, so far, has not been exploited.
It is reasonable that different uncertainty frameworks
necessitate different decision models: for belief repre-
sented by sets of probabilities [18, 23], for the DS belief
function theory [10, 21, 7], and for possibility theory
[5, 6]. However, the absence of a critical examination
of the cottage industry of decision models contributes
to their limited use in practice.
Here I outline a plan for such a comparative study.
Suppose (∆i)
∞
i=1 is a sequence of plausibility measures
converging to ∆. The convergence limi→∞∆i = ∆,
can be suitably defined in the manner of definition 3.
I can assume the continuity of the ce operator.
Continuity on plausibility For any converging se-
quence (∆i)
∞
i=1, lim∆i→∆ E(∆i, f) = E(∆, f).
In particular, if ∆ is vacuous, the condition becomes
lim∆i→∆ E(∆i, f) = EV (f). That is, for a ce operator
E to be sequentially consistent (for any plausibility
measure), a necessary condition is that at the limit
to the vacuous belief, it must have the form of eq. 7.
Just as all decision models must agree on an act under
certainty, it is reasonable to expect that they do so
when apply to the vacuous belief. In particular, denote
by ξsp, ξds and ξpo the representations of certainty in
three frameworks: the sets of probability functions,
DS belief function theory and possibility theory and
by ωsp, ωds and ωpo their vacuous belief.
Consensus on certainty
For any act f, E(ξsp, f) = E(ξds, f) = E(ξpo, f).
By itself, this equality is uninteresting and is trivially
satisfied by all decision models. But the force of logic
equally applies for the case of vacuous belief.
Consensus on vacuous belief
For any act f, E(ωsp, f) = E(ωds, f) = E(ωpo, f).
This requirement is nontrivial, in fact, has never been
considered before in literature.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I draw the ideas from research in eco-
nomics on decision under ignorance and from research
in computer science on uncertainty representation.
Economists treat ignorance as a ghostlike object, “you
can talk about it but you can’t see it”. For this con-
cept, computer scientists have specific representations,
the vacuous beliefs, and treat them like an ordinary
state of belief. Because of that, the questions about
dynamic consistency in decision making suddenly be-
come sensible for the case of ignorance. I formalize the
sequential consistency criterion by adapting the law of
iterated expectation for plausibility measures. Based
on Nehring-Puppe’s characterization [15] of a prefer-
ence under ignorance by Independence (I) and Conti-
nuity (C) conditions, I add a new requirement of se-
quential consistency. The necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a sequentially consistent ce operator to cor-
rectly implement Nehring-Puppe’s preference is given.
I speculate about how this result can be used to com-
pare the models of decision making under uncertainty.
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